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Jeremy Travis 
Back-End Sentencing: A 
Practice in Search of a 
Rationale 
THE PHENOMENON OF BACK-END SENTENCING - THE PRACTICE OF SEND- 
ing people back to prison for violations of the terms of their parole 
supervision - has grown significantly over recent years and now occu- 
pies a prominent role in the new realities of incarceration and prisoner 
reentry (Travis and Christiansen 2006; Travis 2005; Travis and Lawrence, 
2002a). In 1980, approximately 27,000 people were sent to back to prison 
for violating the terms of their parole. By 2000, that number had grown 
to over 200,000. America now sends more people to prison for parole 
violations than were sent to prison in 1980 for any reason, including 
commitments on new convictions and parole violations. The growth in 
back-end sentencing has far outstripped the overall growth in incarcer- 
ation in America. The per capita rate of incarceration increased slightly 
more than fourfold between 1973 and 2000; over the same period of 
time, the growth in incarcerations for parole violations grew sevenfold. 
Another perspective on back-end sentencing illustrates the impact of 
the robust practice of parole revocation on America's prisons. In 1980, 
18 percent of all prison admissions were individuals who were being 
returned on parole violations; by 2000, that number had increased to 
34 percent. The new reality that one in three people coming in the front 
door of our prisons had relatively recently left through the back door 
underscores the importance of the efforts now under way to rethink 
the efficacy and purposes of parole supervision (Petersilia, 2003). 
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THE NEXUS BETWEEN PAROLE REVOCATION AND 
SENTENCING 
Some may criticize the use of the word "sentencing" to describe the revo- 
cation of parole for violation of the conditions of supervision. Sentencing, 
they would say, is the act of imposing sanctions for criminal behavior, 
proven in a court following a trial or plea of guilty. What happens in 
the parole violation context, the critique might continue, is merely the 
continuing application of that original sentence. In other words, the 
process of adjudicating the violation of terms of parole release, includ- 
ing a return to prison in some cases, is part of the original sentence. The 
defendant knew - and everyone else knew - at the time of sentence that 
following the release from prison, he would be subjected to a term of 
supervision, with conditions, and failure to abide by those conditions 
could result in a removal from the community and deprivation of liberty. 
Certainly it is unassailable to assert that the process of adjudicat- 
ing parole violations is recognized as flowing from the original convic- 
tion and sentence. Stated differently, the only reason that the former 
prisoner is subjected to this process is because of the original conviction 
and sentence. But the conceptual and operational similarities between 
the two systems are, to me, so compelling that I see every reason - and 
believe there should be no hesitation - to call the process of adjudicat- 
ing parole violations a form of sentencing. 
In both systems, we use the enforcement agencies of the state 
(police or parole) to detect violations of rules (criminal laws or condi- 
tions of supervision), arrest and detain those suspected of those infrac- 
tions (defendants or parole violators), bring cases and suspects before a
neutral adjudicative ntity (judge or hearing officer), provide an oppor- 
tunity for determinations of fact through adversarial process (with 
some distinctions between the systems), determine guilt (with differing 
levels of proof ) and impose sanctions for violations of those rules, up to 
and including the deprivation of liberty. 
In the case of the process of adjudicating parole violations and 
revoking parolee liberty, if it walks like a duck, looks like a duck, and 
quacks like a duck, we should call it what it is: a system of sentencing. 
ASSESSING THE LACK OF ATTENTION TO BACK-END 
SENTENCING 
This analysis raises an obvious question, namely, why has the sentenc- 
ing framework not been applied to the practice of parole revocations? 
The answer to this question resonates with a larger concern regarding 
the new focus on prisoner eentry. Those of us who have been engaged 
in research, policy analysis, and advocacy on reentry issues are often 
asked, "Why has the nation paid so little attention to the realities of 
reentry - with over 630,000 people leaving state and federal prison last 
year - while paying so much attention to other issues of sentencing 
reform, prison expansion, parole abolition, and related justice policy 
concerns?" 
There may be no satisfactory answer to this question. We can 
speculate that the sentencing debates of the last generation - regarding 
mandatory minimums, just desserts, truth in sentencing, rehabilita- 
tion versus retribution, selective incapacitation, life without parole, 
the death penalty, determinate versus indeterminate sentencing - were 
so engrossing, so hard-fought, so all-consuming that there was little 
oxygen left in the air of our discourse on justice to consider the deep 
personal, social, political, and jurisprudential consequences of our deci- 
sions to significantly expand the use of incarceration as our predomi- 
nant response to criminal behavior. 
We can also note our language of sentencing jurisprudence has 
not given much weight to the workings of the back end of our justice 
system. For example, we have been taught to use the phrases "civil 
disabilities" or "collateral consequences" to refer to the sanctions that 
legislatures place on individuals convicted of felonies. This regime of 
diminished liberty has become quite extensive - millions of people in 
America cannot vote, drive a vehicle, receive food stamps or welfare 
payments, return to their homes in public housing, receive student 
loans, reunite with their children, or even remain in this country 
because our legislatures have determined to add new sanctions to 
their felony convictions (Travis, 2002). I prefer to call these enactments 
what they are - a form of punishment - and, because we have not paid 
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attention to their role in our system of sentencing, have called them 
"invisible punishment" (Travis, 2002). So, too, we have allowed the 
system of back-end sentencing to become invisible, hidden from public 
view, difficult to discern in part because we do not use the language 
of punishment, criminal sanctions, and sentencing to describe these 
phenomena. 
One could also argue that, as a consequence of our demoniza- 
tion of criminals and our deeper impulse to create distinctions between 
"us" and "them," we neglected to consider the individuals affected by 
our justice system, and therefore have lost sight of the fact that we had 
more than quadrupled the rate of incarceration in this country, with all 
the ripple effects upon prisoners, their families, and their communi- 
ties. We put them not only out of sight - in faraway prisons - but we 
put them out of mind. 
Just as we neglected, for whatever eason, to consider "the iron 
law of imprisonment" (Travis, 2005) - the reality that, with the rare 
exceptions of people who die in prison, all people incarcerated return 
to free society - so too we neglected to pay sufficient attention to the 
profound changes in the way that the parole system was managed, 
how it responded to the same get-tough impulses affecting every other 
aspect of our criminal justice policy, and the relationship between 
parole revocations and the growth of our prison system. For years, Joan 
Petersilia was perhaps the lone scholar conducting serious research on 
this topic. Now we can say that she has been joined by dozens of others, 
but we have a lot of lost ground to recover. 
IMAGINING THE APPLICATION OF MODERN SENTENCING 
DEBATES TO BACK-END SENTENCING 
Had we kept the back-end of our criminal justice system at the front of 
our sentencing discussions over the past generation - had we consid- 
ered the parole violation process a form of sentencing - perhaps we 
would have systematically subjected this form of sentencing to the 
robust and sometimes raucous debates of this era. It is an instructive 
exercise to subject the practice of back-end sentencing to the analytical 
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frameworks of three sentencing debates that dominated the American 
discourse on punishment policy over the past generation. 
First, we should apply the fundamental justice principle that "like 
cases should be treated alike" to the practice of back-end sentencing. This 
principle animated a sustained critique of the system of indeterminate 
sentencing, a critique which found political acceptance in California's 
adoption of a determinate sentencing system in 1976. How could a system 
of sentencing, it was argued, be considered just if two defendants, facing 
similar charges and with similar backgrounds and criminal records, 
receive significantly different sentences, depending on the judge impos- 
ing the sentence (Frankel, 1973)? A parallel critique was leveled at the 
system of parole release. Critics pointed out that the decision to release 
a prisoner on parole varied according to the composition of the parole 
board, the state of overcrowding of the prisons, or other extraneous 
factors, thereby violating the fundamental principle that like cases be 
treated alike. This principle also energized a critique of our sentencing 
practices as being racially discriminatory. Research showing that defen- 
dants of color received harsher sentences - and were less likely to be 
released on parole - fueled the attacks on indeterminate sentencing. 
If the equal treatment principle were applied to back-end 
sentencing, we would first want to know empirically whether the 
current system treats like cases alike. We would collect data, on a regu- 
lar basis, showing the dispositions of parole violations according to the 
characteristics of parolees, the severity of the underlying offense, and 
the prior record of the parolee, including the record of previous parole 
violations. To complete the analogy, we can assume, arguendo, that this 
analysis would show variations in sanctions that could not be easily 
reconciled with the justice mandate of the equal treatment principle. 
This would appear to be a reasonable assumption, based on research 
conducted in California nd elsewhere (Travis and Lawrence, 2002b), 
but the troubling point is that we simply do not know the answer to 
this question today. 
Assuming we find unequal treatment in back-end sanctions, 
we would then borrow a page from the history of front-end sentenc- 
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ing reform. We would ask what steps should be taken to reduce the 
disparities. The legislature could intervene to establish criteria for 
parole violation and revocations, as has been the case in sentencing 
policy around the country. Or the legislature could empower sentenc- 
ing commissions to create sentencing grids for sanctions for parole 
violations, with allowances for upward and downward departures 
from those guidelines. Or the executive branch, which oversees most 
parole systems, could develop these guidelines, following a period of 
notice and comment consistent with administrative rulemaking. Or, in 
more extreme cases, the judicial branch might find that some back-end 
sanctions violate constitutional or statutory protections and require 
or impose corrective measures. The basic point is that the branches of 
government responsible for overseeing the exercise of the profound 
power to deprive individuals of their liberty should step in to ensure 
that the system itself operates in ways consistent with notions of equal 
treatment. 
Second, we should consider the application of "just desserts" prin- 
ciples to the practices of back-end sentencing. Under these principles, a 
criminal sanction is deemed appropriate, or legitimate, if the severity of 
the sanction reaffirms the social norms underlying the creation of the 
crime itself (von Hirsch, 1976). In other words, the "just desserts" prin- 
ciple is violated if a murderer is punished less severely than a burglar. 
The legislative decision to designate murder as a more severe crime 
than burglary is devalued if the criminal justice system is allowed to 
punish the former more leniently than the latter. Application of this 
principle to justice reform efforts over the past 30 years has resulted in 
greater degrees of legislative specification of criminal sentences, such 
as mandatory minimums, so that the judicial branch had greater diffi- 
culty meting out sentences that could be seen as diminishing the sever- 
ity of the offense. 
If we were to apply this principle to back-end sentencing, we 
would, once again, begin by conducting some empirical research 
to determine the sanctions applied to different violations of social 
norms. In carrying out this exercise, we would quickly confront one 
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of the underlying tensions in this policy arena: the blurred distinction 
between parole violations for technical offenses and those for new 
crimes. In some states we would find, as Sarah Lawrence and I did in 
our analysis of parole revocations in California, that prison sentences 
imposed for relatively minor parole violations, such as failed drug tests, 
are not substantially shorter than sentences imposed for parole viola- 
tions where the underlying misconduct was recorded as murder, rape, 
and assault (Travis and Lawrence, 2002b). 
Before addressing the question of the proper treatment of parole 
violations for new crimes, we should focus attention on the "just 
desserts" question regarding parole revocations for technical viola- 
tions. Perhaps it is appropriate to send someone back to prison for 
four months for a failed drug test, as Sarah Lawrence and I found in 
California. An argument supporting this deprivation of liberty would 
be stronger if this sanction were reserved for those determined to be 
recalcitrant, who had consistently engaged in drug use after trying a 
series of progressively restrictive alternatives. This policy would be 
considered more legitimate if there were research demonstrating that 
this new prison sentence was positively correlated with reductions in 
criminal behavior and drug use. This policy would generate some well- 
deserved skepticism, but the larger policy point that we should engage 
in a debate, backed up by empirical research and reflecting sound 
sentencing principles, before we authorize the exercise of state power 
as is now the case in sanctions for parole violations. 
Third, we should apply the principles of "truth-in-sentencing" 
to the system of back-end sentencing (Ditton and Wilson, 1999). One 
can view the "truth-in-sentencing" movement hat swept the country 
in the late 1980s as simply a stalking horse for the get-tough-on-crime 
agenda of the conservative wing of the crime policy debates. Setting this 
critique aside, however, there is an important kernel in this rhetoric 
that we should cultivate. In language borrowed from earlier critiques of 
indeterminate sentencing, proponents of "truth-in-sentencing" argued 
for greater transparency in sentencing practices, greater certainty in 
outcomes, and public accountability for matching rhetoric with prac- 
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tice. Public confidence in our system of justice is undermined, the argu- 
ment went, whenever the system operated in the dark and decisions 
were not subject to public scrutiny. 
As was noted earlier, however, the system of back-end sentenc- 
ing is hidden from public view. Who knows the rules of this particu- 
lar game? Do our legislatures know the punishments meted out for 
various parole violations? Is a parolee told that certain infractions will 
result in designated punishments, so that he can modify his behavior 
accordingly and, if sanctioned, cannot say, "no one told me this might 
happen." The establishment of a sentencing rid - whether by the legis- 
lature, a sentencing commission, or the executive branch - would at 
least provide for public accountability and fair notice to parolees, their 
families and their advocates. 
The application of "truth-in-sentencing" principles to back-end 
sentencing would also expose, for public debate, the practice of send- 
ing parolees back to prison for new crimes. This practice poses serious 
issues in terms of the underlying fairness of our criminal justice system. 
On one extreme, there are cases, such as those that Sarah Lawrence and 
I found in California, in which the return to prison on a parole viola- 
tion appeared to be inconsistent with the seriousness of the underlying 
behavior. Our analysis highlighted cases involving murder, rape, and 
robbery that were treated as parole violations and resulted in returns 
to prison, not on new convictions for those offenses, but on the viola- 
tion of parole. California is certainly not alone in this practice - nearly 
a third of all returns to prison for parole violations in 2000 were for 
new crimes. But the California analysis highlights the problems with 
this aspect of back-end sentencing. The murder and rape cases in our 
analysis received an average of several months in prison, far less than 
they would have received had they been prosecuted and convicted as 
new arrests. 
What is remarkable has been the lack of public outcry about these 
cases. There has been no agitation by crime victims groups, demanding 
that these crimes be taken seriously. Nor have the survivors of these 
rapes and families of the homicide victims picketed the offices of crimi- 
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nal justice leaders, asking how they could devalue the lives that had 
been damaged or lost. The hidden world of back-end sentencing has 
allowed the justice system to escape accountability - an ironic result in 
an era when public outrage, media excess, and political attention have 
brought every other aspect of justice policy into the blinding glare of 
public scrutiny. 
Certainly there are different policy solutions to the dilemma of 
posed by technical versus new crime parole violations. I have argued 
that the two should be decoupled, and new crimes should be prose- 
cuted as new crimes, with possible penalty enhancements to recognize 
that repeated offenses hould be treated more severely (Travis, 2005). 
But the larger point is that we should have this debate in public, before 
legislative committees, sentencing commissions, or rulemaking enti- 
ties such as parole boards, so that our system of justice is firmly rooted 
in a legitimate political process, rather than carried out in the back 
rooms of our prisons and parole agencies. 
BACK TO BASICS: RECONSIDERING THE GOAL OF 
SUPERVISION 
Development of a jurisprudential rationale for back-end sentencing 
will require reconsideration of the nature of parole supervision itself. 
Historically, courts had relied on several different theories to justify the 
imposition of conditions upon the liberty of individuals released from 
prison, including the ultimate revocation of that liberty. As set forth 
by Fisher, these rationales all envision a strong-state, weak-individual 
relationship between the parole system and the parolee (Fisher, 1974). 
In one view of parole, the prisoner is released back into the community 
as an act of grace by the state, meaning that the liberty was a privilege, 
not a right. In another theory, the terms of supervision are viewed as 
a contract between the state and the formerly incarcerated individual, 
such that violation of the contract carries the implicit understanding 
that the liberty itself may be revoked. In a third theory of parole super- 
vision, the formerly incarcerated individual is considered a "quasi- 
prisoner," not a free man, still subject to the control of the state, so 
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that a return to prison is simply another form of regulation of custody. 
Finally, parole is sometimes justified as a form of parens patriae, which 
holds that the parole board is operating in the best of intentions for the 
former prisoner, namely to accomplish successful rehabilitation and 
reintegration. In this view, a return to prison is legitimate because the 
parolee is not acting in his own best interests and the state, as watchful 
guardian, is entitled to remove him to prison. 
These theories have been undermined by a string of judicial deci- 
sions, including the landmark case Morrissey v. Brewer (408 U.S. 41 7, 1 972), 
which have established minimum procedural requirements for parole 
revocations, but the conceptual confusion remains. More recently, legal 
theorists have developed the argument that parole supervision has 
become a form of state regulation of deviant subgroups in our soci- 
ety, with significant racially disparate consequences (Feeley and Simon, 
1992). In this view, the goal of parole supervision is state control over 
deviant groups, and the methods of parole supervision have shifted 
to accommodate the control mission to include more surveillance, 
confinement, and revocation of liberty. 
If, in the modern era, we consider the purpose of parole supervi- 
sion to be maintaining control over a high-risk population, then the 
justification for the revocation of parole will reflect heories of risk 
management. Revocation would be deemed appropriate in cases where 
the parolee was deemed high risk, and the misconduct giving rise to 
the parole violation was determined to be a predictor of more serious 
misconduct. In this view, a revocation of parole for a failed drug test 
would not be justified on the basis of theories that parole is a matter of 
grace, a contract, or form of continued custody. Rather, the revocation 
would be based on an assessment of the individual prisoner's high-risk 
status, and an assertion that, for this particular parolee, a failed drug 
test likely means that he will commit a more serious infraction in the 
future. In this view, the role of the court or judicial officer, in consid- 
ering a recommendation for the revocation of parole, is to determine 
whether the parole authorities had developed an appropriate assess- 
ment of risk for the individual parolee. 
640 social research 
Although this is the justification frequently cited for our system of 
parole revocations - that the parole agencies are very efficient a  detect- 
ing misconduct that could lead to serious public safety violations - there 
is little research to back up the claim. On the contrary, a provocative 
body of literature is emerging that undermines the basic argument 
that placing former prisoner under supervision is an effective way to 
enhance public safety. A report by the Urban Institute found supervision 
itself does not reduce crime (Solomon, Kachnowski, and Bhati, 2005). 
Those prisoners released to parole supervision were no less likely to be 
rearrested than those released with no supervision. An earlier study by 
the Rand Corporation found that intensive supervision does not reduce 
crime (Petersilia and Turner, 1993). Before we could justify a system of 
back-end sentencing as being necessary to manage the risks posed by 
parolees, we should first develop supervision and revocation policies 
that are proven, in rigorous research, to be effective at reducing crime. 
This would require, in turn, a fundamental rethinking of our approach 
to parole. Once the general policies are proven effective, we would then 
require that supervisory agents have the research-based tools to indi- 
vidualize the application of those policies. In other words, before the 
liberty of a parolee is taken away, the state should be required to demon- 
strate that the parole agent has 1) accurately assessed the parolee's 
overall risk, using a scientifically valid instrument, and 2) empirically 
determined that the behavior giving rise to the revocation proceedings 
is a likely precursor to new criminal behavior. 
In an alternative view, one I have advocated elsewhere (Travis, 
2005), we could understand the parole system as society's mechanism for 
supporting the process of transition of returning prisoners from a condi- 
tion of incarceration toa state of freedom, with the ultimate twin goals of 
reducing recidivism and achieving reintegration. In this view, a success- 
ful parole system is one that reduces failure (for example, the return to 
crime, or relapse to drug or alcohol abuse) and promotes positive recon- 
nection to family, work, peer networks, and community. Revocation of 
parole would be deemed appropriate in only two instances. First, if the 
parolee commits another crime, this failure would result in a new prose- 
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cution for that crime, with the possibility of enhanced penalties because 
the new crime was committed uring a period of supervision. Second, if a 
parolee is persistently unwilling to engage in the activities necessary for 
successful reintegration (for example, drug treatment, or mental health 
counseling), then his parole could be revoked for a short period of time 
to reinforce the legitimacy and seriousness of the supervisory process. 
This is the rationale used in drug treatment courts to justify the depriva- 
tion of liberty for short periods of time for offenders under supervision of 
a drug court who do not comply with conditions of drug treatment. 
Again, we should require the research community to provide the 
basis for this rationale for parole and the revocation of parole through 
back-end sentencing. In this view, the deprivation of liberty for failure 
to meet the conditions of parole (other than avoidance of new crimes) 
would be a rare event, exercised only when necessary to ensure compli- 
ance with those conditions of supervision demonstrated in rigorous 
research to promote the goals of public safety and prisoner eintegra- 
tion. As previously mentioned, the literature on drug courts suggests 
that this approach might be effective (Harrell and Roman, 1999), but 
there has be no similar study on the parolee population which, by defi- 
nition, is more diverse and shares the experience of reentry from prison 
that is not common to the drug court population. 
We thus come full circle, reaffirming the value of considering 
back-end sentencing as a form of sentencing. As traditionally formu- 
lated, criminal sentencing is intended to accomplish a number of 
societal goals, including retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and 
incapacitation. When we consider the specific form of sentencing we 
practice under the guise of parole revocation, we need to determine 
whether his form of sentencing is intended to express moral condem- 
nation, rehabilitate the parolee, deter him and others from misconduct, 
or simply put him back in prison to avoid new crimes. 
A CHALLENGE TO LEGITIMACY 
In an era marked by historically high rates of incarceration, we have 
also constructed a system of back-end sentencing that lacks a firm 
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jurisprudential rationale. This failure to provide a well-reasoned basis 
for the deprivation of liberty of hundreds of thousands of individuals a
year poses a risk of undermining the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
process, indeed the rule of law, in the small number of communities that 
are now experiencing record high rates of incarceration, reentry, and 
removal. If viewed as a form of sentencing, the practice of parole revoca- 
tion does not pass muster under various analytical frameworks typically 
applied to sentencing systems. The development of a jurisprudence of 
back-end sentencing must begin with an understanding of the purposes 
of parole supervision itself, and then square the purpose of parole with 
the traditional justifications for sentencing. If academics, legal scholars, 
and practitioners can launch a robust debate on the jurisprudence of 
back-end sentencing, then there is hope that we can shed some light on 
a very dark corner of our criminal justice policy: the American practice 
of routinely sending hundreds of people a day back to prison. 
NOTES 
* This paper is based on a speech delivered at the Symposium on 
Back-End Sentencing and Parole Reform that was sponsored by the 
Criminal Justice Center of the Stanford Law School on November 4, 
2006. The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of 
Meghan Sachs, a doctoral student in the criminal justice program at 
John Jay College of Criminal Justice. 
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